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M
any companies isolate their most valu-
able assets—intellectual property—in
wholly owned domestic subsidiaries.
Known as intellectual property holding
companies (IPHCs), these subsidiaries
have provided companies with substantial state corpo-
rate income tax benefits. But the recent confluence of
increased state challenges to IPHCs and the issuance
by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 
of Financial Interpretation No. 48, Accounting for Uncer -
tainty in Income Taxes, (FIN 48; now codified in FASB
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) topic 740)
have significantly reduced the efficacy of the IPHC as a
tax-planning technique. With the tax benefits of the
IPHC dwindling, companies have an opportunity to
reevaluate how they deploy their intellectual property
and whether the IPHC represents the best structure to
carry out their business strategies.
In this article, we briefly provide some background
on IPHCs, then document and analyze how recent state
responses to IPHCs and FIN 48 have combined to
reduce the tax and financial statement benefits that
IPHCs historically provided. We also discuss the busi-
ness and legal ramifications of continuing to hold and
manage intellectual property through an IPHC and
innovative ways in which a company can use an IPHC
to facilitate structured finance and securitization or joint
venture transactions.
BACKGROUND
To use an IPHC, a business isolates its intellectual
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owned subsidiary (the IPHC). The IPHC licenses the
intellectual property to its parent and sister
 companies—the affiliates that actually carry out the
business operations of the enterprise. The operating
affiliates pay a royalty to the IPHC, taking a state tax
deduction for the amount paid and reducing state cor-
porate income tax liability. Because the IPHC is typi -
cally established in a state that does not tax royalty
income or does not have a corporate income tax, such as
Delaware, the IPHC pays no tax on the royalty income
it receives. Further, the IPHC will often lend money to
other members of the affiliated group, generating inter-
est deductions for the operating companies. In effect,
IPHCs allow taxpayers to siphon profits from high-tax
states to no-tax states. IPHCs thus provide cash flow
benefits and, often, financial statement benefits via
reduced reported income tax expense.
STATE RESPONSES TO IPHCS
Historically content to live with IPHCs, states have
become more aggressive in recent years in response to
fiscal pressures and press accounts of the prolificacy of
IPHCs. For example, in an August 9, 2002, The Wall
Street Journal article titled “Diminishing Returns: A Tax
Maneuver in Delaware Puts Squeeze on States,” Glenn
R. Simpson listed many well-known companies that
used IPHCs. As Table 1 shows, only three states with a
corporate income tax—Delaware (a haven for IPHCs),
Missouri, and Pennsylvania—have not enacted anti-
IPHC measures. Every other state combats IPHCs in
some fashion.
States can eliminate the tax benefits of an IPHC by
arguing it is a sham under the economic substance doc-
trine. Beyond this general approach—or in combination
with it—states use one or more of the following cate-
gories of anti-IPHC measures: mandatory combined
reporting, add-back statutes, and economic nexus rules
(see Table 1). Nexus generally means having some con-
nection with the state, such as having employees or
property in the state.
Economic Substance and Business Purpose
With the right facts, states can claim an IPHC is a sham
that lacks economic substance. If the state prevails in
this argument, it can disallow deductions for royalties
paid to the IPHC. The Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts heard two cases on the same day that
best illustrate this approach: Sherwin-Williams Co. v.
Commissioner of Revenue, 778 N.E. 2d 504 (Mass. 2002)
and Syms Corp. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 765 N.E. 2d
758 (Mass. 2002).
In Sherwin-Williams, the company claimed $47 mil-
lion in deductions for payments to its related IPHCs.
The court ruled for the taxpayer and upheld the deduc-
tions. While the court upheld the Commissioner’s rul-
ing that the IPHCs did not have a business purpose
independent of tax savings, the court found that the
IPHCs had economic substance—indicating that they
were not shams. The following influenced the court:
 Sherwin-Williams’s in-house intellectual property
lawyer suggested setting up the IPHCs to centrally
manage the property.
 The IPHCs had legal title and physical possession of
the marks.
 The IPHCs entered into licensing agreements with
third parties. 
 The funds the IPHCs generated did not return to
Sherwin-Williams as dividends.
 The IPHCs made third-party licensing and invest-
ment decisions independently rather than Sherwin-
Williams making them.
In Syms, the court held that Syms’s IPHC was a 
sham and lacked economic substance. The key factors
 included:
 An outside consultant suggested setting up the
IPHC to save on taxes rather than to manage the
Syms trademarks.
 The company paid the outside consultant a fee of
25% of the tax savings the IPHC generated and
placed a portion of the fee in escrow in case of an
audit.
 Syms only paid the royalty to the IPHC once per
year; the IPHC would hold the funds for a couple of
weeks and then remit the amount of the royalty, less
expenses, back to Syms as a dividend.
 Syms managed the trademarks the same before and
after it formed the IPHC.
 Syms continued to pay most of the expenses of main-
taining the marks despite the existence of the IPHC.
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In both Syms and Sherwin-Williams, the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts used a “disjunctive”
test under which it would respect the IPHC if it had
either business purpose or economic substance. In
2010, Congress enacted Internal Revenue Code (IRC)
Section 7701(o) to codify and clarify the common law
economic substance doctrine. Section 7701(o) applies a
“conjunctive” test under which the IRS would respect
a transaction for federal tax purposes only if it had both
business purpose and economic substance apart from
federal income tax savings. As of this writing, it is
unclear whether states that have traditionally used a
disjunctive test will follow the federal lead and switch
to a stricter conjunctive test. Had the court in Sherwin-
Williams applied a conjunctive test, the taxpayer may
have lost because the court found that the IPHCs—
while having economic substance—lacked business
purpose.
Companies should follow the Sherwin-Williams exam-
ple and ensure that their IPHCs have economic sub-
stance and fulfill a valid business purpose. (The busi-
ness reasons for IPHCs and guidance on establishing a
valid business purpose for an IPHC are addressed in
the section titled “The Business and Legal Ramifica-
tions of IPHCs.”) Companies should also monitor for
states possibly using a conjunctive economic substance
test and ensure that they structure IPHCs to pass the
test.
Mandatory Combined Reporting
An increasing number of states are reducing the tax
benefits of IPHCs by requiring affiliated corporations
engaged in the same business to file a combined tax
return. To understand this approach, some background
is necessary. States take either a separate-entity or
 combined-reporting approach to taxing an affiliated
group of corporations in which only some members
have nexus with the state. Separate-entity states base
their tax on an apportioned share of the income of only
those members with nexus in the state. Combined-
reporting states, in contrast, base their tax on the appor-
tioned share of the income of the single unitary busi-
ness earned by the entire affiliated group—regardless of
whether all members have nexus in the state. While the
boundaries of the unitary business are not always clear,
states usually consider IPHCs to be engaged in the
same unitary business as their operating affiliates.
The combined tax return eliminates intercompany
income and deductions, such as royalty payments from
an operating company to a related IPHC. As such,
mandatory combined reporting effectively eliminates
the tax benefits of the IPHC in the combined-reporting
state. The U.S. Supreme Court in Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983) held
that mandatory combined reporting based on the uni-
tary business concept is constitutional.
Prior to 2004, only 16 states used combined report-
ing. Vermont sparked a small trend in 2004 when it
became the first state in more than 20 years to adopt
mandatory combined reporting. How far this trend will
go is not clear, but more separate-entity states may turn
to combined reporting if they fail to stem revenue
 losses from IPHCs by other means, such as the add-
back and economic nexus approaches we will discuss
later. As Table 1 shows, 23 states and the District of
Columbia currently use mandatory combined reporting.
In addition, separate-entity states sometimes have the
right to force companies to file on a combined-reporting
basis under certain circumstances.
There is little that companies can do to recapture 
the tax benefits eliminated by combined reporting.
Combined-reporting statutes, however, normally do not
mandate worldwide combined reporting, so a company
could move its IPHC offshore to increase the available
tax benefits. Many large companies have done so, and
the states are just beginning to recognize the impact on
their revenue streams. As of this writing, some states
are contemplating mandatory worldwide combined
reporting as a solution. (For details on the state-by-state
revenue impact of foreign IPHCs, see the February
2013 article, “The Hidden Cost of Offshore Tax
Havens: State Budgets Under Pressure from Tax Loop-
hole Abuse,” on the U.S. PIRG Education Fund’s web-
site, www.uspirgedfund.org.) Establishing an IPHC in a
foreign jurisdiction raises many practical and legal
issues that are beyond the scope of this article.
Add-Back Statutes
As Table 1 shows, 18 states and the District of Colum-
bia have enacted add-back statutes to blunt the tax
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benefits of IPHCs. An add-back statute disallows
deductions for royalties, interest, or other payments to
an affiliated IPHC. There is an unresolved issue over
whether add-back statutes are constitutional.
Add-back statutes do not merely eliminate the tax
benefit of IPHCs; they effectively leave the taxpayer
worse off than if the IPHC did not exist. If the in-state
operating affiliate held the intellectual property directly,
there would be no royalty deduction, but the costs of
maintaining such property would be deductible. If the
IPHC holds the intellectual property and an add-back
statute applies, then the royalty deduction is eliminated
and the maintenance costs are not deductible because
they are incurred by the out-of-state IPHC.
Add-back statutes often contain many exceptions
that companies can use to lessen the impact. For exam-
ple, some states exempt payments to IPHCs that are
taxed to the IPHC in another jurisdiction, are “reason-
able,” or are not made with a tax-avoidance purpose.
Many states that provide these exceptions require
explicit disclosures of the IPHC arrangement. Further-
more, a company may be able to structure its IPHC
arrangements to fall outside the scope of the add-back
statute. For example, if the statute disallows “royalties,”
the company may attempt to reclassify its payments to
the IPHC as management fees, interest, or some other
payment.
Economic Nexus
Rather than disallowing the royalty deduction on the
in-state operating company’s tax return, some states
assert nexus and tax an apportioned share of the income
of the out-of-state IPHC. This is an aggressive
approach because the IPHC normally has no physical
presence in the taxing state. States taking this approach
argue that the IPHC has economic nexus by virtue of
using its intellectual property in the state.
The battle between the states and taxpayers over
economic nexus has been one of the most contentious
in recent memory and has resulted in a great deal of
costly litigation. The battle lines are drawn around the
interpretation of Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S.
298 (1992), which addressed nexus in the sales and use
tax context under the Commerce Clause of the U.S.
Constitution. Quill reaffirmed the rule that an out-of-
state mail order company could not be forced to collect
use tax on behalf of a state in which the company’s only
contacts were the mailing of catalogs into the state and
shipment of orders into the state via U.S. mail or com-
mon carrier. Taxpayers argue that Quill provides a
“physical presence” concept of nexus that extends into
the corporate income tax arena and forbids states from
taxing companies, like IPHCs, that have no physical
presence in the taxing state. States, however, argue that
Quill’s physical presence concept is limited to sales and
use tax collections by mail order companies and does
not apply in the income tax context.
The South Carolina Supreme Court gave the concept
of economic nexus credence in Geoffrey, Inc. v. South
Carolina Tax Commission, 437 S.E.2d 13 (S.C. 1993).
Geoffrey, Inc. was the IPHC for Toys “R” Us and held
the Toys “R” Us trade name and licensed it to affiliated
companies that ran the Toys “R” Us stores. Geoffrey
licensed the trade name to the Toys “R” Us affiliate
that owned the South Carolina store, but Geoffrey itself
had no employees or tangible property in the state.
Nonetheless, the court ruled that Geoffrey had nexus 
in the state because the Toys “R” Us affiliate that oper-
ated the South Carolina store was using Geoffrey’s
intangible property (the trade name) in the state.
As Table 1 shows, at least 20 states have economic
nexus rules in some form. These states either generally
assert economic nexus, whether or not targeted at
IPHCs, or specifically follow the Geoffrey doctrine by
regulation, administrative practice, or judicial decision.
Actual practice can vary, so it is unclear how far some of
these states will assert economic nexus for IPHCs.
States that have mandatory combined-reporting rules,
for example, may assert economic nexus. But such
states should not, absent special circumstances, need to
deploy economic nexus rules against an IPHC because
the combined return already captures the income of the
IPHC. In addition, states that are not identified as hav-
ing economic nexus rules in Table 1 may have broadly
worded nexus rules that could be interpreted as assert-
ing economic nexus. Some states, for example, have
generic rules that assert nexus as far as the U.S. Consti-
tution allows—a standard that can change over time as
the courts interpret the constitutional limits on state tax
jurisdiction.
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While states have been successful with the Geoffrey
argument, economic nexus raises serious constitutional
questions. The U.S. Supreme Court to date has
declined to review any of the state court decisions
applying the Geoffrey doctrine. Congress, however, is
considering a Business Activity Tax (BAT) nexus bill
that would, among other provisions, mandate a physical
presence nexus standard.
Companies can continue to argue that the Geoffrey
doctrine is unconstitutional and support the federal leg-
islation mandating a physical presence standard. Even if
Congress enacts the BAT bill, states still can turn to
other devices to combat IPHCs, such as add-back
statutes or combined reporting.
FIN 48
Many companies used IPHCs not only because they
generated cash from tax savings, but also because they
Table 1. State Responses to IPHCs
Economic Economic
Mandatory Add- Nexus/ Mandatory Add- Nexus/
Combined Back Geoffrey Combined Back Geoffrey
Reporting Statute Rule Reporting Statute Rule
Alabama X X Montana X
Alaska X Nebraska X
Arizona X X Nevada No Corporate Income Tax
Arkansas X New Hampshire X
California X X New Jersey X X
Colorado X X New Mexico X
Connecticut X X New York X X
Delaware Haven for IPHCs North Carolina X X
Dist. of Columbia X X North Dakota X
Florida X Ohio X X
Georgia X Oklahoma X
Hawaii X Oregon X X X
Idaho X Pennsylvania
Illinois X Rhode Island X
Indiana X X South Carolina X
Iowa X South Dakota No Corporate Income Tax
Kansas X Tennessee X X
Kentucky X Texas X
Louisiana X Utah X
Maine X Vermont X
Maryland X X Virginia X
Massachusetts X X X Washington No Corporate Income Tax
Michigan X X West Virginia X
Minnesota X Wisconsin X X
Mississippi X Wyoming No Corporate Income Tax
Missouri
Note: Table 1 depicts laws or policies currently in force and enacted laws scheduled to be effective in the future. Data is
current as of January 2013. The purpose of this table is to show that the states are very active in responding to the tax ben-
efits of IPHCs; it is not designed as a comprehensive tax planning guide. Taxation of IPHCs is a complex and dynamic area
of the law. Please consult the current law in your state for updates, effective dates, exceptions, and special rules.
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provided financial statement benefits via reduced
reported income tax expense. Prior to 2006, accounting
for uncertain tax positions varied. Some companies used
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5
(SFAS No. 5), Accounting for Contingencies. A company
doing so would establish a reserve against a recorded
tax benefit if it were probable a court would not sustain
the benefit and the company could reasonably estimate
the amount of the lost benefit.
In 2006, FASB issued FIN 48 to provide more trans-
parency and standardize financial statement reporting
for uncertain tax positions. (FIN 48 is now codified in
FASB ASC 740, but practitioners still use the FIN 48
reference.) Under FIN 48, a company can only report a
tax benefit on its financial statements if the benefit is
more likely than not (a greater than 50% chance) to be
ultimately sustained on audit or in court. Even after this
threshold is met, the company must go through a com-
plex measurement exercise to determine the benefit
that can actually be recorded.
When conducting a FIN 48 analysis, the company
must assume that the tax benefits at issue will be
 audited and that the tax authority will have full knowl-
edge of the relevant facts. Companies that historically
took an SFAS No. 5 approach will have to meet a
 higher standard under FIN 48 before they can report
tax benefits on their financial statements. Given this
higher threshold and the increased success states have
had combating IPHCs, IPHCs are unlikely to provide
significant financial statement benefits in the future.
THE BUSINESS AND LEGAL
RAMIFICATIONS OF IPHCS
With the tax and financial statement benefits disappear-
ing, the business and legal ramifications of IPHCs
become paramount. In their zeal to save taxes, many
companies established IPHCs without critically exam-
ining the strategy implications. Even if a company con-
sidered the business ramifications before establishing
an IPHC, many years may have passed since the IPHC
was set up, and industry conditions and business prac-
tices may have changed. Accordingly, all companies
with an IPHC should consider the business and legal
factors we discuss. First, we consider intellectual prop-
erty administration and asset protection, then look at
unique legal issues that arise with respect to two com-
mon types of intellectual property: patents and trade-
marks. We then discuss innovative ways in which
IPHCs can help facilitate structured finance and securi-
tization and joint venture transactions.
Intellectual Property Administration
An IPHC allows a company to centrally organize and
manage all the intellectual property of the corporate
group. The greater the number of operating companies,
the greater the need for centralized registration, mainte-
nance, and enforcement of the group’s intellectual
property. Consolidating these services in-house enables
a company to reduce reliance on outside legal counsel
and thereby cut costs and improve internal efficiencies.
Asset Protection
One of the most important legal benefits of an IPHC is
that it allows a company to quarantine its intellectual
property from claims against the operating companies
exploiting it. By placing the intellectual property in a
holding company that does not have a contractual or
other relationship with end customers, it becomes less
likely that a customer or other third party can bring a
claim against the owner of the intellectual property (the
IPHC).
Moreover, this arrangement also protects the operat-
ing companies. For example, the owner of intellectual
property may be contractually obligated to join as a
 party in litigation to enforce the intellectual property,
thereby opening up that party to countersuit. If the
operating company does not own the intellectual prop-
erty, then it may not be joined as a party in the litiga-
tion. Furthermore, if the IPHC owns the intellectual
property, then it may be joined in the litigation, but it
will likely be immune from countersuit because the
IPHC does not exploit the intellectual property. The
end result is greater protection from liability for the
entire corporate enterprise.
Special Issues with Patents
While IPHCs can provide substantial legal liability pro-
tection, they can create certain legal problems with
respect to patents. Specifically, the IPHC cannot re -
cover profits lost by the operating company when the
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license between the companies is nonexclusive. Under
a nonexclusive license, the IPHC is free to license the
same rights to multiple parties, thereby enabling the
IPHC to leverage the sales and marketing resources of
more than one company.
In Poly-America, L.P. v. GSE Lining Technology, Inc., 383
F.3d 1303 (Federal Circuit 2004), the court stated,
“Poly-America and Poly-Flex may not enjoy the advan-
tages of their separate corporate structure and, at the
same time, avoid the consequential limitations of that
structure—in this case the inability of the patent holder
to claim lost profits of its nonexclusive licensee.” Thus,
while an exclusive license arrangement might allow the
IPHC to claim the lost profits of the operating com -
pany, it also would prevent the IPHC from exploiting
its intellectual property to the fullest extent possible.
Special Issues with Trademarks
IPHCs that hold trademarks risk losing the marks if
they do not structure their license arrangements prop -
erly. If an IPHC does not use the trademark itself, the
trademark is susceptible to removal from the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office’s register for nonuse. Use
of a trademark by the licensee is considered use by the
owner only if the owner controls the licensee’s use of
the mark by financial, quality, or other control. Finan-
cial control occurs if the licensee is a subsidiary of the
owner and is subject to the owner’s financial control,
while quality control occurs where the owner enforces
quality standards. Thus, the easiest way to address this
issue is to structure the corporate enterprise with the
IPHC as the parent company and the operating compa-
nies as subsidiaries.
The more common arrangement, where the IPHC is
a brother/sister or subsidiary (rather than the parent) of
the licensee, stands on shakier ground. There are sev -
eral ways, however, in which the corporate enterprise
can minimize the risk of losing trademark rights. In fact,
it is a good idea to implement the following practices
regardless of where the IPHC resides in the corporate
structure. The IPHC should:
 Enter into a formal license agreement with the
 operating company;
 Monitor and retain records of the operating
 company’s goods and services and their use in
 commerce;
 Perform periodic inspections of the operating
 company’s marketing and advertising materials;
 Maintain legal staff consisting of at least one
 qualified attorney;
 Negotiate licenses with third parties; and
 Monitor third-party competitors and prosecute
infringers.
Additionally, the license agreement between the
IPHC and the operating company should include at
least the following provisions:
 Set a definite term for the license;
 Condition renewal on the operating company’s full
compliance with quality-control measures;
 Define a clear standard of quality that must be main-
tained, and consider incorporating industry or gov-
ernment standards;
 Grant a nonexclusive license to permit additional
licenses to third parties;
 Define accepted forms of trademark use and proper
trademark notices;
 Give the IPHC the right to inspect the operating
company’s goods, services, and facilities; and
 Require the operating company to provide periodic
reports describing sales and royalty calculations.
Implementing these measures will make the IPHC
look more like a user of the trademarks in the eyes of
the courts.
INNOVATIVE WAYS TO USE IPHCS
IN TRANSACTIONS
IPHCs can provide innovative benefits beyond their
traditional roles of holding and managing intellectual
property for an affiliated group of corporations. In par-
ticular, IPHCs can play important roles in business
strategy by facilitating structured finance and securitiza-
tion transactions and joint ventures.
Structured Finance and Securitization
By physically separating a company’s intellectual prop-
erty from its other assets, the company can more easily
use intellectual property as a security or sell it outright.
It is easier to assign value to an enterprise’s intellectual
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property when the company has separated it from the
enterprise’s other assets. Consequently, it is easier to
securitize or sell intellectual property held by an IPHC.
Furthermore, as a company’s business objectives
change, it may want to sell off certain intellectual prop-
erty but retain the right to use and exploit such prop -
erty. Rights conferred by the nonexclusive license
between the IPHC and the operating companies will
survive the IPHC selling the intellectual property to a
third party. In other words, the sale of intellectual prop-
erty owned by an IPHC does not extinguish the operat-
ing company’s right to continue to use the property pur-
suant to a nonexclusive license.
Joint Ventures
One of the most troublesome issues confronting compa-
nies that want to partner in an intellectual property-
related venture is determining which party owns the
intellectual property that results from the collaboration.
For example, with respect to patents, each joint owner
can exploit the patent without the permission of the
other joint owners. Also, the exploiting owner is not
required to share the royalties. In effect, these rules cre-
ate an incentive for third-party licensees to play the
joint owners against one another to get the best deal.
Furthermore, to enforce the patent, all of the joint own-
ers must join in the suit, which means that any joint
owner may block a lawsuit by refusing to join or by
entering into a license with the potential defendant.
If more than one type of intellectual property is
involved in the venture, then the situation becomes
even more complicated. For example, in contrast to
patent law, copyright law requires joint owners of a U.S.
copyright to share royalties. If the particular asset
involved in the venture is software, which both patent
and copyright law often cover, it will be a challenge for
the joint owners to determine which portion of the soft-
ware is subject to royalty sharing and which is not.
While companies may choose to enter into agree-
ments that set forth their rights and obligations with
respect to the jointly owned intellectual property, these
agreements are not always enforceable against third
 parties. For example, if one of the joint owners sells a
product to a third party in violation of an agreement
prohibiting such sales, the third party still may be pro-
tected as a bona fide purchaser for value. Therefore, the
nonbreaching joint owner will not be able to prevent
the third party from using the product.
The IPHC presents companies with a way to avoid
the pitfalls associated with joint ownership, and, specifi-
cally, parties to a joint venture can choose to set up an
IPHC in which each party owns a percentage of equity.
The IPHC owns any intellectual property created
through the joint venture, and the parties share risks,
returns, and management via their equity ownership in
the IPHC. This strategy is particularly useful when the
parties seek to exploit intellectual property created by
the joint venture by licensing it to and/or enforcing it
against third parties. With this approach, a single entity
manages the intellectual property, thereby avoiding a
scenario in which separate joint owners compete with
one another to secure favorable licensing deals.
One potential risk of using an IPHC to hold patents
in the joint venture context, however, is that it may
weaken protection from “prior art” claims. For subject
matter to be patentable, it must be sufficiently different
from things that the public already knows or uses such
that a person having reasonable skills in the area of
technology related to the subject matter would not
 consider to be obvious. The America Invents Act
changes the “first-to-invent” patent system to a “first-
inventor-to-file” system for applications filed on or after
March 16, 2013. Under the Act, “prior art” includes
information made available to the public anywhere in
the world as of the filing date through sales, publica-
tions, public use, or other kinds of public disclosures.
This expanded definition, however, includes a grace
period for publications by the inventor within one year
of the patent  filing.
Under Section 103(c) of the Patent Act, subject mat-
ter developed by an employee of one of the parties to
the joint venture might be considered prior art and
could expose the IPHC, the owner of the putative
patent, to claims of obviousness. To minimize the likeli-
hood of such claims, employees of the joint venture/
IPHC, rather than employees of the joint venture par-
ties, should perform all development work. Alterna -
tively, if one party to the joint venture has already
 started development work, then that party should com-
plete the work, obtain the patent, and only then trans-
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fer the completed patent to the joint venture/ IPHC.
While it might be advisable to set up a joint venture
as an IPHC from the beginning, a company can also use
this technique when winding down a joint venture. For
example, the members of the joint venture might
decide to end the joint venture’s operations but restruc-
ture it as an IPHC that can grant licenses to members
and enforce the intellectual property rights against third
parties. Finally, a joint venture that is structured as an
IPHC is more attractive to potential buyers because it
isolates the intellectual property from other assets and
is, therefore, easier to value.
RETHINKING HOW TO POSITION
VALUABLE ASSETS
With IPHCs providing fewer tax benefits, companies
have the opportunity to rethink how they deploy their
intellectual property. Companies should study the state
tax rules in this article, position their IPHCs to best
maintain the tax advantages still available, and monitor
both state law developments and the progress of federal
BAT legislation. Companies should also take a critical
look at the business and legal ramifications of continu-
ing to use IPHCs to maintain their intellectual property
and consider using IPHCs to facilitate strategic transac-
tions, such as structured finance and securitization or
joint venture arrangements. Assessing the proper role of
an IPHC can be difficult, and the analysis will vary by
industry and type of property. Such an analysis, how -
ever, ensures that the company best positions its most
valuable assets to further the company’s business
 strategy.  
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